An AI vendor security questionnaire is the set of questions you send an AI supplier before its model, platform or embedded feature touches your data: whether it trains on your inputs, how long it keeps them, who else processes them, how it resists prompt injection and limits agent permissions, what it logs, how it reports incidents, its EU AI Act role and how you leave.
The question bank below has 33 questions in eleven domains, each with the answer you want and the answers that should slow or stop a deal. The frameworks, regulations and versions it relies on were checked on 14 October 2026. It is a working tool for security, privacy and procurement teams, not legal advice.
Our procurement guide covers how to run the whole evaluation, and our procurement checklist for regulated organisations covers contract clauses and the exit test. This page is the security and data part, ready to paste into an email or a GRC tool.
Which frameworks the questionnaire draws on
| Framework | Status on 14 October 2026 | What it contributes |
|---|---|---|
| NIST AI RMF 1.0 (NIST AI 100-1) | Released 26 January 2023; NIST says it is being revised | GOVERN 6.1 and 6.2, MAP 4.1 and 4.2, and MANAGE 3.1 and 3.2 address third-party AI risk |
| NIST AI 600-1, Generative AI Profile | Published July 2024 | Action GV-6.1-009 asks for vendor due diligence updated for generative AI; GV-6.2-007 lists contract terms such as incident notification |
| ISO/IEC 42001:2023 | Edition 1, December 2023 | Requirements for an AI management system; if a vendor claims certification, the scope decides what it proves |
| OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 | Published August 2026, replacing the 2025 list | Prompt Injection stays LLM01; Excessive Agency rises to LLM03; System Prompt Leakage becomes Hidden Context Exposure (LLM08) |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix v1.1 | Released 22 June 2026 | 247 control objectives in 18 domains, with the AI-CAIQ question set and mappings to ISO/IEC 42001, NIST and the EU AI Act |
| EU AI Act | In force; amended in July 2026 by the Digital Omnibus, Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 | Duties a vendor may carry as provider: Articles 13, 16, 25(4), 50, 53 and 73 |
Templates that cite the 2025 OWASP numbering need updating, since Excessive Agency was LLM06 there. Agent-specific risks sit in OWASP’s separate Top 10 for Agentic Applications, announced on 9 December 2025, including ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation and ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse.
The AI vendor due diligence questionnaire
Number the questions so that answers can be scored and quoted in the contract, and ask for evidence with each one: a clause, a report, a screenshot or a test you can repeat.
1. Data use and model training
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | Do you use our prompts, files, outputs, embeddings or feedback to train, fine-tune or evaluate any model, including your suppliers’ models? | No, stated in the contract and the data processing agreement, feedback included | On unless we opt out; “de-identified” use left undefined |
| 1.2 | Do your staff or contractors ever read our content, and why? | Only in support cases we open, logged, with access approved | Routine review “to improve quality” |
| 1.3 | Is our data used for anything beyond providing the service to us? | No: processing only on our documented instructions, as GDPR Article 28(3)(a) requires | Benchmarking or marketing use in the terms |
2. Retention and deletion
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1 | How long do you keep prompts, outputs, files, embeddings, logs and backups, and can we shorten each period? | A period per data type, configurable, backups included | One figure for everything, or “as long as necessary” |
| 2.2 | Do you keep data for abuse monitoring or safety review, for how long, and who can see it? | A separate stated period with restricted, logged access | A “zero retention” claim that leaves this out |
| 2.3 | At contract end, how is our data returned and deleted, including copies held by sub-processors? | Export, then deletion within a stated period, with written confirmation (GDPR Article 28(3)(g)) | Deletion “under our policy”, no confirmation |
3. Sub-processors and data location
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Which sub-processors, including model providers, receive our data, for what purpose and where? | A current list with purpose and location for each | The model provider missing from the list |
| 3.2 | How are we told about new or replaced sub-processors, and can we object? | Advance notice with a right to object, as GDPR Article 28(2) provides | Changes posted on a web page without notice |
| 3.3 | Where does inference run, and can processing be pinned to a region, our cloud tenancy or our data centre? | Pinning written into the contract; a customer-hosted option | ”Global routing for performance” |
For how location differs from control, see our note on data sovereignty and data residency.
4. Model provenance and licences
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1 | Which models and versions power the service, who trained them and under which licences? | Named models, versions and licences that permit our use | ”A proprietary blend”, no names |
| 4.2 | If a general-purpose AI model is inside, can you share its provider’s documentation for downstream providers (Article 53(1)(b), Annex XII) and say which GPAI Code of Practice chapters it signed? | A summary under NDA and the signature status | The vendor cannot name the underlying model |
| 4.3 | How much notice do we get before a model or system prompt changes, and can we pin a version? | Advance notice, release notes and pinning | Silent updates; “always the latest model” |
5. Security testing and red-teaming
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | When was the service last tested independently, were the AI features in scope, and can we see the summary? | A recent test covering the AI features, with fix status | A website-only penetration test |
| 5.2 | Do you red-team the AI features for prompt injection, data leakage and misuse, and against which framework? | Regular exercises mapped to the OWASP 2026 list and NIST AI 600-1 actions MS-2.7-007 and MS-2.10-001 | ”Our model provider handles safety” |
| 5.3 | Which certifications or assurance reports cover this AI service, with what scope and validity dates? | Current documents that name the AI product | A scope that excludes the AI product, or a parent company’s certificate |
6. Prompt injection and agent permissions
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1 | How do you stop instructions hidden in documents, emails, web pages or tool results from steering the system? | Layered controls with test results: untrusted content kept apart, outputs validated, tools restricted | ”The model is trained to ignore them” as the only defence |
| 6.2 | Which actions can the system take in our other systems, under whose identity and with which permissions? | Per-tool allow-lists, least privilege, the user’s own permissions | Agents acting through one service account that can read everything |
| 6.3 | Which actions can we require a person to approve first, and are approvals logged? | Approval steps we configure, logged with approver and time | Approval enforced in the interface but not the API |
An injected instruction can only do what the agent’s permissions allow, which is why 6.2 deserves more weight than 6.1.
7. Identity and access
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1 | Do you support single sign-on with our identity provider, and do roles follow our directory groups? | Group-to-role mapping and prompt removal of leavers | Local accounts that must be removed by hand |
| 7.2 | Can we limit which roles see which data sources, tools and models? | Access enforced at retrieval, with source permissions inherited | Every user can query everything indexed |
| 7.3 | Who on your side can reach our tenant or data, with whose approval, and is that logged? | Named roles, access we approve, logs we can read | Broad support access without logs |
8. Logging and audit
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8.1 | What do you log: prompts, retrieved sources, tool calls, outputs, approvals, admin changes? | All of these, with user, time and model version | Usage or billing counts only |
| 8.2 | Can we export logs to our SIEM, and who sets retention? | A documented export with retention we set; at least six months for high-risk systems (Articles 19 and 26(6)) | Logs visible only in the vendor console |
| 8.3 | Can each event be tied to the model version and configuration in use? | Version and configuration IDs on every event | No version history |
9. Incident response
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9.1 | How fast will you tell us about a security incident or personal data breach affecting our data? | A contractual deadline that fits our own reporting duties, with named contacts | ”Without undue delay” and nothing more |
| 9.2 | Do you treat harmful or wrong AI behaviour as an incident, and how is it reported? | AI failures in the incident process; for high-risk systems, Article 73 reporting within 15 days, faster in the gravest cases | Only outages count as incidents |
| 9.3 | Can you suspend a feature, model or agent for us quickly and roll back a model change? | A per-feature off switch and tested rollback | One shared model version for all customers |
10. EU AI Act role and obligations
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10.1 | What is your role for this service: provider of an AI system, provider of a general-purpose AI model, both or neither? Is it high-risk in our intended use? | Role and reasoning stated, checked against our use case | ”The AI Act does not apply to us”, without reasons |
| 10.2 | If it is high-risk, will you supply instructions for use with the content Article 13(3) requires, and support our oversight, logs and FRIA? | Instructions before signature, with accuracy figures and known limits | Instructions withheld until after signature |
| 10.3 | How do you meet Article 50: telling people they are dealing with AI, and marking generated content in a machine-readable way? | Disclosure built in and a named marking method; systems on the market before 2 August 2026 marked by 2 December 2026 | No marking plan |
If you build your own high-risk system on the vendor’s model or tools, Article 25(4) requires a written agreement covering the information, technical access and assistance you need as its provider. Public bodies preparing a fundamental rights impact assessment will reuse the answers to 10.2.
11. Exit and portability
| # | Question | A good answer | Red flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11.1 | Which data and assets can we export at exit: documents, embeddings, indexes, agent and workflow definitions, prompts, evaluation sets, logs? In which formats? | A full list in open formats, export tested in the pilot | Chat transcripts only |
| 11.2 | What notice period, transition support and switching charges apply? | Terms within the Data Act limits where it applies | Charges or notice beyond those limits |
| 11.3 | Can the workload run on our own infrastructure or models if we leave? | A self-hosted option or a model-agnostic design | Workflows tied to one hosted model |
For services that count as data processing services, the Data Act requires switching terms in the contract, a notice period of no more than two months and a transition of no more than 30 days (Article 25), and bars switching charges from 12 January 2027 (Article 29).
How to score vendor questionnaire answers
Score each answer from 0 to 3:
| Score | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0 | No answer, a refusal, or an answer contradicted by evidence |
| 1 | A claim without evidence |
| 2 | Documented in a policy, a contract clause or the vendor’s own report |
| 3 | Verified by an independent report covering the AI service, or by a test you ran |
Then weight the domains by use:
| Use | Domains to weight up |
|---|---|
| Chat assistant over internal documents | 1, 2, 3, 7 |
| Agent that writes to business systems | 6, 7, 8, 9 |
| High-risk use under Annex III | 4, 8, 10 |
| AI feature switched on inside software you already use | 1, 3, 4 |
Pick three to five knock-out questions before the answers arrive, so that no total can buy them back: typically 1.1 for confidential data, 3.3 where data must stay in a jurisdiction, 6.2 for agents with write access, 10.1 and 11.1. A workable rule is to proceed at a weighted average of 2.0 or more with no failed knock-out, to proceed only with remediation terms in the contract between 1.5 and 2.0, and to stop below 1.5. Treat those thresholds as a starting point to calibrate. Record each score and its evidence in your risk register; our AI risk assessment template has a vendor section.
Running the AI vendor assessment questionnaire
- Tier the vendor first. A feature that sees only public data needs domains 1 to 3 and 8; an agent with write access to finance systems needs all eleven.
- Ask for what already exists: a completed AI-CAIQ or STAR Registry entry, certificates with their scope, the latest test summary, the data processing agreement, the sub-processor list, model documentation and, for high-risk uses, the instructions for use.
- Send only the gaps, with a deadline and an evidence requirement per question.
- Verify in the pilot. Block outbound traffic and see what fails, export the logs, and run a known prompt-injection case against your own documents.
- Write the answers into the contract: training ban, retention periods, sub-processor notice, incident deadlines, version pinning and exit assistance. EU public buyers can start from the Commission-hosted model contractual clauses for AI, in a full version for high-risk systems and a light one for others.
- Ask again on every trigger: a new model, sub-processor or agent capability, a serious incident, and each renewal.
The functional side of the evaluation sits in our RFP checklist, and the AI vendor risk agent reads returned questionnaires and certificates against your criteria and reports missing evidence as findings.
Vendor questionnaire examples: answers to read twice
- “We never train on your data.” Ask where the contract says so, whether it covers feedback, and whether it binds the model provider underneath.
- “We hold ISO/IEC 42001 certification.” Ask for the certificate, the certification body and the scope; a certificate for one product line says little about another.
- “Zero data retention.” Ask whether that covers abuse-monitoring logs, caches and backups.
- “Agents only do what the user could do.” Ask for the permission model and a log of a blocked action. A shared service account makes the statement untrue.
How VDF AI fits
VDF AI is a vendor too, and answers questionnaires like this one against a concrete reference architecture. Its trust center sets out the deployment models, controls and sub-processor position for security and procurement reviews.
In a self-hosted deployment, many answers describe your environment rather than ours. On-premises, private cloud and air-gapped deployments need no third-party model API for production inference, data stays inside your perimeter, and you set retention and log export. Role-based access control is included on every plan, audit events can stream to your SIEM, and VDF AI Router keeps each workload on approved models, with an air-gap mode that routes only to local ones. Questions on updates, vulnerability handling and model provenance still apply to us.
Sources
Framework pages, standards listings and legal texts checked on 14 October 2026.
- NIST AI RMF page
- NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0 (PDF)
- NIST AI 600-1, Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile (PDF)
- ISO/IEC 42001:2023 listing at ISO
- OWASP GenAI Security Project: Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026
- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025
- Cloud Security Alliance: AI Controls Matrix v1.1 and AI-CAIQ
- EU AI Act consolidated text of 27 July 2026
- Digital Omnibus on AI, Regulation (EU) 2026/1744
- GDPR, Regulation (EU) 2016/679
- Data Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/2854
- European Commission: contents of the General-Purpose AI Code of Practice
- EU model contractual clauses for AI procurement (Public Buyers Community)
Sending your first AI vendor questionnaire? Start with the procurement guide, or see how VDF AI answers these questions in the trust center.